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Consensus of Multi-Agent Networks in the
Presence of Adversaries Using Only Local
Information
Heath LeBlanc, Haotian Zhang, Shreyas Sundaram, and Xenofon Koutsoukos
Abstract
This paper addresses the problem of resilient consensus in the presence of misbehaving nodes.
Although it is typical to assume knowledge of at least some nonlocal information when studying secure
and fault-tolerant consensus algorithms, this assumption is not suitable for large-scale dynamic networks.
To remedy this, we emphasize the use of local strategies to deal with resilience to security breaches.
We study a consensus protocol that uses only local information and we consider worst-case security
breaches, where the compromised nodes have full knowledge of the network and the intentions of the
other nodes. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the normal nodes to reach consensus
despite the influence of the malicious nodes under different threat assumptions. These conditions are
stated in terms of a novel graph-theoretic property referred to as network robustness.
I. INTRODUCTION
The engineering community has experienced a paradigm shift from centralized to distributed
system design, propelled by advances in networking and low-cost, high performance embedded
systems. In particular, this has led to significant interest in the design and analysis of multi-
agent networks. A multi-agent network consists of a set of individuals called agents, or nodes,
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equipped with some means of sensing or communicating along with computational resources
and possibly actuation. Through a medium, which is referred to as the network, the agents share
information in order to achieve specific group objectives. Some examples of group objectives in-
clude consensus [22], [26], synchronization [6], [27], surveillance [5], and formation control [9].
In order for the group objectives to be achieved, distributed algorithms are used to coordinate
the behavior of the agents.
There are several advantages to using multiple agents over a single one. First, the objective
may be complex and challenging, or possibly even infeasible for a single agent to achieve.
Second, employing many agents can provide robustness in the case of failures or faults. Third,
networked multi-agent systems are flexible and can support reconfigurability. Finally, there are
performance advantages that can be leveraged from multiple agents. For example, in surveillance
and monitoring applications, a multi-agent network provides redundancy and increased fidelity
of information [5], [14].
Along with the advantages come certain challenges. Perhaps the most fundamental challenge in
the design of networked multi-agent systems is the restriction that the coordination algorithms
use only local information, i.e., information obtained by the individual agent through sensor
measurements, calculations, or communication with neighbors in the network. In this manner,
the feedback control laws must be distributed.
A second challenge lies in the fact that not only is each agent typically a dynamical system,
but the network itself is dynamic. This challenge arises because the agents may be mobile and
the environment may be changing, thus giving rise to dynamic (or switching) networks. Since
the distributed algorithms depend directly on the network, this additional source of dynamics
can affect the stability and performance of the networked system.
An especially important challenge is that multi-agent networks, like all large-scale distributed
systems, have many entry points for malicious attacks or intrusions. For the success of the group
objective, it is important that the cooperative control algorithms are designed in such a way that
they can withstand the compromise of a subset of the nodes and still guarantee some notion of
correct behavior at a minimum level of performance. We refer to such a multi-agent network
as being resilient to adversaries. Given the growing threat of malicious attacks in large-scale
cyber-physical systems, this is an important and challenging problem [4].
One of the most fundamental group objectives is to reach consensus on a quantity of interest.
This concept is deeply intuitive, yet imprecise. Hence, there are several variations on how
consensus problems are defined. At one extreme, consensus may be unconstrained, and there is
no restriction on the agreement quantity. In other cases, consensus may be partially constrained
by some rule or prescribed to lie in a set of possible agreement values which are in some way
reasonable to the problem at hand. At the other extreme, consensus may be function constrained,
or χ-constrained, in which case the consensus value must satisfy a particular function of the
initial values of the nodes [7], [28]. In all of these cases, it is important that consensus algorithms
be resilient to various forms of uncertainty, whether the source of uncertainty is caused by
implementation effects, faults, or security breaches.
The problem of reaching consensus resiliently in the presence of misbehaving nodes has
been studied in distributed computing [15], [20], communication networks [11], and mobile
robotics [1], [3], [8]. Among other things, it has been shown that given F Byzantine or malicious
nodes, there exists a strategy for the misbehaving nodes to disrupt consensus if the network
connectivity1 is 2F or less. Conversely, if the network connectivity is at least 2F +1, then there
exists strategies for the normal nodes to use that ensure consensus is reached [20], [23], [29].
However, these methods either require that normal nodes have at least some nonlocal information
or assume that the network is complete, i.e., all-to-all communication or sensing [1], [3], [8],
[15], [16]. Moreover, these algorithms tend to be computationally expensive. Therefore, there is
a need for resilient consensus algorithms that are low complexity and operate using only local
information.
Typically, an upper bound on the number of faults or threats in the network is assumed, i.e.,
at most F out of n nodes fail or are compromised. We refer to this threat assumption, or scope
of threat, as the F -total model. In cases where it is preferable to make no global assumptions,
we are interested in other threat assumptions that are strictly local. For example, whenever each
node only assumes that at most F nodes in its neighborhood are compromised (but there is no
other bound on the total number of compromised nodes), the scope of threat is F -local.
In addition to the number of misbehaving nodes, one can consider various threat models
for the misbehaving nodes; examples include non-colluding [23], malicious [16], [23], [29], or
1The network connectivity is defined as the smaller of the two following values: (i) the size of a minimal vertex cut and (ii)
n− 1, where n is the number of nodes in the network.
Byzantine [1], [15], [18], [32] nodes. Non-colluding nodes are unaware of the network topology,
which other nodes are misbehaving, or the states of non-neighboring nodes. On the other hand,
malicious nodes have full knowledge of the networked system and therefore, worst case behavior
must be assumed. The only difference between malicious and Byzantine nodes lies in their
capacity for deceit. Malicious nodes are unable to convey different information to different
neighbors in the network, whereas Byzantine nodes can.
Recently, we have studied resilient algorithms in the presence of misbehaving nodes. In [16],
we introduce the Adversarial Robust Consensus Protocol (ARC-P) for consensus in the presence
of malicious agents under the F -total model in continuous-time complete networks, with the
agents also modeled in continuous time. The results of [16] are extended to both malicious and
Byzantine threat models in networks with constrained information flow and dynamic network
topology in [18]. In [34], we study general distributed algorithms with F -local malicious adver-
saries, encompassing ARC-P. In [18], [34], we show that traditional graph theoretic properties
such as connectivity and degree, which have played a vital role in characterizing the resilience
of distributed algorithms (see [20], [29]), are no longer adequate when the agents make purely
local decisions (i.e., without knowing nonlocal aspects of the network topology). Instead, in [34]
we introduce a novel topological property, referred to as network robustness, and show that this
concept is highly effective at characterizing the ability of purely local algorithms to succeed.
Separate sufficient and necessary conditions are provided in [34] for ARC-P to achieve resilient
consensus in discrete time, and it is shown that the preferential attachment mechanism for
generating complex networks produces robust graphs.
In this paper, we continue our study of resilient consensus in the presence of malicious
nodes while using only local information. We are interested in partially constrained, asymptotic
consensus in dynamic networks. To allow for multiple interpretations of the results, we formulate
the problem in a setting common to discrete and continuous time for node dynamics and time-
invariant or time-varying network topologies. We extend the Adversarial Robust Consensus
Protocol (ARC-P) introduced in [16] to weighted networks. We then describe robust network
topologies that are rich enough to enable resilience to malicious nodes, but are not too restrictive
in terms of communication cost (i.e., number of communication links); in particular, we gener-
alize the robustness property of [34]. Given these topological properties, we fully characterize
the consensus behavior of the normal nodes using ARC-P under the F -total model of malicious
nodes, and provide, for the first time, a necessary and sufficient condition for the algorithm to
succeed. Additionally, for the F -local threat model, we provide improved separate necessary and
sufficient conditions for asymptotic agreement of the normal nodes in the presence of malicious
nodes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces the problem in a framework
common to discrete and continuous time. Section III presents ARC-P in the unified framework.
Section IV motivates the need for robust network topologies and introduces the formal definitions.
The main results are given in Section V. A simulation example is presented in Section VI. Finally,
some discussion is given in Section VII.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Consider a time-varying network modeled by the (finite, simple) directed graph, or digraph,
D[t] = {V, E [t]}, where V = {1, ..., n} is the node set and E [t] ⊂ V×V is the directed edge set at
time t. The nodes are assumed to have unique identifiers that form a totally ordered set I. Without
loss of generality2, the node set is partitioned into a set of N normal nodes N = {1, 2, . . . , N}
and a set of A adversary nodes A = {N + 1, N + 2, . . . , n}, with A = n − N . Let Γn denote
the set of all digraphs on n nodes, which is of course a finite set. Note that D[t] ∈ Γn for all
t, where t ∈ R≥0 for continuous time and t ∈ Z≥0 for discrete time. When we wish to refer to
both discrete and continuous time, we generically say at time t.
The time-varying topology of the network is governed by a piecewise constant switching
signal σ(·), which is defined on Z≥0 for discrete time and R≥0 for continuous time, and takes
values in Γn. In order to emphasize the role of the switching signal, we denote Dσ(t) = D[t].
Let {τk}, k ∈ Z≥0 denote the set of switching instances. For continuous time, we assume that
there exists some constant τ ∈ R>0 such that τk+1 − τk ≥ τ for all k ≥ 0. In other words, σ(·)
is subject to the dwell time τ .
Each directed edge (j, i) ∈ E [t] models information flow and indicates that node i can be
influenced by (or receive information from) node j at time t. The set of in-neighbors, or just
neighbors, of node i at time t is defined as Vi[t] = {j ∈ V : (j, i) ∈ E [t]} and the (in-)degree of
i is denoted di[t] =|Vi[t]|. Likewise, the set of out-neighbors of node i at time t is defined as
2There exists a bijection from I to V = N ∪ A.
Vouti [t] = {j ∈ V : (i, j) ∈ E [t]}. Because each node has access to its own state at time t, we also
consider the inclusive neighbors of node i, denoted Ji[t] = Vi[t] ∪ {i}. Note that time-invariant
networks are represented simply by dropping the dependence on time t.
A. Update Model
Suppose that each node i ∈ V begins with some private value xi[0] ∈ R (representing a
measurement, opinion, vote, etc.), which evolves over time. Let xN [t] = [x1[t], x2[t], . . . , xN [t]]T
and xA[t] = [xN+1[t], xN+2[t], . . . , xn[t]]T denote collectively the value (or state3) trajectories of
the normal and adversary nodes, respectively, and let x[t] = [xTN [t], xTA[t]]T. The nodes interact
synchronously by conveying their value to (out-)neighbors in the network. Each normal node
updates its value over time according to a prescribed rule, which is modeled as
D [xi[t]] = fi,σ(t)(t, xN , xA), i ∈ N ,Dσ(t) ∈ Γn,
where D [xi[t]] = x˙i[t] is the derivative operator for continuous time and D [xi[t]] = xi[t+1]−
xi[t] is the forward difference operator for discrete time. Collectively, we define the system of
normal nodes by
D [xN [t]] = fσ(t)(t, xN , xA), xN [0] ∈ R
N ,Dσ(t) ∈ Γn, (1)
where fσ(t)(·) = [f1,σ(t)(·), . . . , fN,σ(t)(·)]T. Each of the functions fi,σ(t)(·) can be arbitrary,4
and may be different for each node, depending on its role in the network. These functions are
designed a priori so that the normal nodes reach consensus. However, some of the nodes may
not follow the prescribed strategy if they are compromised by an adversary. Such misbehaving
nodes threaten the group objective, and it is important to design the fi,σ(t)(·)’s in such a way
that the influence of such nodes can be eliminated or reduced without prior knowledge about
their identities.
B. Threat Model
Definition 1: A node k ∈ A is said to be malicious if
3Throughout this paper we refer to a node’s value and state interchangeably.
4In continuous time, fσ(t)(·) must satisfy appropriate assumptions to ensure existence of solutions.
• it is not normal (i.e., it does not follow the prescribed update model either for at least
one time-step in discrete time, or for some time interval of nonzero Lebesgue measure in
continuous time);
• it conveys the same value, xk[t], to each out-neighbor;
• (for continuous-time systems) its value trajectory, xk[t] ∀t, is a uniformly continuous func-
tion of time on [0,∞).
A few remarks are in order concerning malicious nodes. First, each malicious node is allowed
to be omniscient (i.e., it knows all other values and the full network topology; it is aware of the
update rules fi,σ(t)(·), ∀i ∈ N ; it knows which other nodes are adversaries; and it knows the
plans of the other adversaries). The statement in the definition that the malicious nodes are not
normal is intended to capture the idea that they do not apply the prescribed update rule for all
time. The second assumption is intended as an assertion on the network realization. That is, if
the network is realized through sensing or broadcast communication, it is assumed that the out-
neighbors receive the same information. The third point is a technical assumption that applies
only to malicious nodes modeled in continuous time. Limited only by these assumptions, the
malicious nodes are otherwise allowed to operate in an arbitrary (potentially worst case) manner.
C. Scope of Threats
While there are various stochastic models that could be used to formalize the threat as-
sumptions, here we use a deterministic approach and consider upper bounds on the number of
compromised nodes either in the network (F -total) or in each node’s neighborhood (F -local).
Definition 2 (F -total set): A set S ⊂ V is F -total if it contains at most F nodes in the
network, i.e., |S| ≤ F , F ∈ Z≥0.
Definition 3 (F -local set): A set S ⊂ V is F -local if it contains at most F nodes in the
neighborhood of the other nodes for all t, i.e., |Vi[t]
⋂
S| ≤ F , ∀i ∈ V \ S, F ∈ Z≥0.
It should be noted that because the network topology may be time-varying, the local properties
defining an F -local set must hold at all time instances. These definitions facilitate the definitions
of the scope of threat models.
Definition 4: A set of adversary nodes is F -totally bounded or F -locally bounded if it is
an F -total set or F -local set, respectively. We refer to these threat scopes as the F -total and
F -local models, respectively.
Note that whenever the set of A adversary nodes A is F -totally bounded, we know A ≤ F .
On the other hand if A is F -locally bounded, it is possible that A > F . Indeed, there is no upper
bound for F -locally bounded A since it is feasible that many adversaries may not be neighbors
with any of the normal nodes over time. As a matter of terminology, we will refer to the threat
model consisting of F -totally (or F -locally) bounded malicious nodes as the F -total malicious
model (or F -local malicious model). The F -total fault model has been studied in distributed
computing [15], [20], [32] and mobile robotics [1], [3], [8] for both stopping (or crash) failures
and Byzantine failures. The F -local fault model has been studied in the context of Byzantine
fault-tolerant broadcasting [12], [24].
D. Resilient Asymptotic Consensus
Given the threat model and scope of threats, we formally define resilient asymptotic consensus.
Let M [t] and m[t] be the maximum and minimum values of the normal nodes at time t,
respectively.
Definition 5 (Resilient Asymptotic Consensus): The normal nodes are said to achieve resilient
asymptotic consensus in the presence of (a) F -totally bounded, or (b) F -locally bounded
misbehaving nodes if
• ∃L ∈ R such that limt→∞ xi[t] = L for all i ∈ N , and
• [m[0],M [0]] is an invariant set (i.e., the normal values remain in the interval for all t),
for any choice of initial values. Whenever the scope of threat is understood, we simply say that
the normal nodes reach asymptotic consensus.
The resilient asymptotic consensus problem has three important conditions. First, the normal
nodes must reach asymptotic consensus in the presence of misbehaving nodes given a particular
threat model (e.g., malicious) and scope of threat (e.g., F -total). This is a condition on agreement.
Additionally, it is required that the interval containing the initial values of the normal nodes is an
invariant set for the normal nodes; this is a safety condition. This safety condition is important
when the current estimate of the consensus value is used in a safety critical process and the
interval [m[0],M [0]] is known to be safe. The agreement and safety conditions, when combined,
imply a third condition on validity: the consensus quantity that the values of the normal nodes
converge to must lie within the range of initial values of the normal nodes.
The validity condition is reasonable in applications where any value in the range of initial
values of normal nodes is acceptable to select as the consensus value. For instance, consider a
large sensor network where every sensor takes a measurement of its environment, captured as a
real number. Suppose that at the time of measurement, all values taken by correct sensors fall
within a range [a, b], and that all sensors are required to come to an agreement on a common
measurement value. If the range of measurements taken by the normal sensors is relatively
small, it will likely be the case that reaching agreement on a value within that range will
form a reasonable estimate of the measurements taken by all sensors. However, if a set of
malicious nodes is capable of biasing the consensus value outside of this range, the error in the
measurements could be arbitrarily large.
More generally, suppose the nodes are trying to distributively minimize
∑
hi(θ), where each
of the hi’s is a local convex function and θ is the optimization variable. If the initial value of
each node i represents the value of θ that minimizes hi, a convex combination of these initial
values will represent an estimate of the optimal θ, within some bounded error. On the other
hand, if an adversary is capable of biasing the consensus value arbitrarily, the resulting value
of the objective function will also be arbitrarily far away from its minimum value. One can
formulate similar motivating examples for the validity condition in other applications as well;
for instance, a swarm of robots that are trying to flock should not be pulled in arbitrary directions
by a malicious agent in the network.
III. CONSENSUS ALGORITHM
Linear consensus algorithms have attracted significant interest in recent years [22], [26], due
to their applicability in a variety of contexts. In such strategies, at time t, each node senses or
receives information from its neighbors, and changes its value according to
D[xi[t]] =
∑
j∈Ji[t]
wij [t]xj [t], (2)
where wij [t] is the weight assigned to node j’s value by node i at time t.
Different conditions have been reported in the literature to ensure asymptotic consensus is
reached [13], [21], [25], [31], [33]. In discrete time, it is common to assume that there exists a
constant α ∈ R, 0 < α < 1 such that all of the following conditions hold:5
• wij[t] = 0 whenever j 6∈ Ji[t], i ∈ N , t ∈ Z≥0;
• wij[t] ≥ α, ∀j ∈ Vi[t], i ∈ N , t ∈ Z≥0;
• wii[t] ≥ α− 1, ∀i ∈ N , t ∈ Z≥0;
•
∑n
j=1wij[t] = 0, ∀i ∈ N , t ∈ Z≥0.
In continuous time there are similar conditions, except in this case the self-weights are given
by
wii[t] = −
∑
j∈Vi[t]
wij[t], ∀i ∈ N , ∀t ∈ R≥0.
In this case, the weights must be piecewise continuous and uniformly bounded. That is, there
exists β ∈ R>0, β ≥ α, such that wij [t] ≤ β, for all i, j ∈ N and t ∈ R≥0. Similar to the discrete
time case, the weights wij [t] are zero precisely whenever j 6∈ Ji[t], and bounded below by α
otherwise. Together, these conditions imply the analogue of the fourth condition above.
Given these conditions, a necessary and sufficient condition for reaching asymptotic consensus
in time-invariant networks is that the digraph has a rooted out-branching, also called a rooted
directed spanning tree [26]. The case of dynamic networks is not quite as straightforward. In this
case, under the conditions stated above, a sufficient condition for reaching asymptotic consensus
is that there exists a uniformly bounded sequence of contiguous time intervals such that the
union of digraphs across each interval has a rooted out-branching [25]. Recently, a more general
condition referred to as the infinite flow property has been shown to be both necessary and
sufficient for asymptotic consensus for a class of discrete-time stochastic models [30]. Finally,
the lower bound on the weights is needed because there are examples of asymptotically vanishing
weights in which consensus is not reached [19].
In general, the problem of selecting the best weights in the linear update rule (2) is nontrivial,
and the choice affects the rate of consensus. The problem of selecting the optimal weights
(with respect to the speed of the consensus process) in time-invariant, discrete-time, bidirectional
networks is addressed in [33] by formulating a semidefinite program (SDP). However, this SDP is
solved at design time with global knowledge of the network topology. A simple choice of weights
5The conditions on the weights are modified from what is reported in the literature to account for the forward difference
operator. Accounting for this, the updated value of each node is formed as a convex combination of the neighboring values and
its own value.
for discrete-time systems that requires only local information is to let wij [t] = 1/(1 + di[t]) for
j ∈ Vi[t] and wii[t] = −di[t]/(1 + di[t]). In continuous time, a simple choice is to let wij ≡ 1
for j ∈ Vi[t] and wii[t] = −di[t].
One problem with the linear update given in (2) is that it is not resilient to misbehaving
nodes. In fact, it was shown in [10], [13] that a single ‘leader’ node can cause all agents
to reach consensus on an arbitrary value of its choosing (potentially resulting in a dangerous
situation in physical systems).
The Adversarial Robust Consensus Protocol (ARC-P) addresses this vulnerability of the linear
update of (2) by a simple modification. Instead of trusting every neighbor by using every value
in the update, the normal node first removes the extreme values from consideration in the update
by effectively setting their weights (temporarily) to zero. It is be shown in subsequent sections
that this simple strategy provides resilience against malicious nodes in robust networks.
A. Description of ARC-P
At time t, each normal node i obtains the values of other nodes in its neighborhood. At most
F of node i’s neighbors may be malicious; however, node i is unsure of which neighbors may be
compromised. To ensure that node i updates its value in a safe manner, it removes the extreme
values with respect to its own value according to the following protocol.
1) At time t, each normal node i obtains the values of its neighbors, and forms a sorted list.
2) If there are less than F values strictly larger than its own value, xi[t], then normal node i
removes all values that are strictly larger than its own. Otherwise, it removes precisely the
largest F values in the sorted list (breaking ties in a deterministic manner; e.g., by keeping
the values of the nodes with the smaller unique identifiers in I). Likewise, if there are less
than F values strictly smaller than its own value, then node i removes all values that are
strictly smaller than its own. Otherwise, it removes precisely the smallest F values.
3) Let Ri[t] denote the set of nodes whose values were removed by normal node i in step 2
at time t. Each normal node i applies the update
D[xi[t]] =
∑
j∈Ji[t]\Ri[t]
wij [t]xj [t], (3)
where the weights wij[t] satisfy the conditions stated above, but with Ji[t] replaced by
Ji[t] \ Ri[t].
6 Note that if all neighboring values are removed, then D[xi[t]] = 0.
As a matter of terminology, we refer to the bound on the number of larger or smaller values
that could be thrown away as the parameter of the algorithm. Above, the parameter of ARC-P
under the F -local and F -total models is F .
Observe that the set of nodes removed by normal node i, Ri[t], is possibly time-varying.
Hence, even though the underlying network topology may be fixed, ARC-P effectively induces
switching behavior, and can be viewed as the linear update of (2) with a specific rule for state-
dependent switching (the rule given in step 2).
B. ARC-P in Continuous Time
The previous section outlined the steps taken in ARC-P to remove the influence of nodes with
extreme values. In order to analyze (1) for existence and uniqueness of solutions in continuous
time, it is useful to express ARC-P as a composition of functions. For this, we require the
following definitions.
Definition 6: Let k ∈ N and F ∈ Z≥0. Denote the elements of vectors ξ, w, z ∈ Rk by ξl, wl,
and zl, respectively, for l = 1, 2, . . . , k. Then:
(i) The (ascending) sorting function on k elements, ρk : Rk → Rk, is defined by ξ = ρk(z)
such that ξ is a permutation of z which satisfies
ξ1 ≤ ξ2 ≤ · · · ≤ ξk; (4)
(ii) The weighted zero-selective reduce function with respect to F and k, rk0,F : Rk×Rk → R,
is defined by (5), where 1≥0(α) and 1≤0(α) are indicator functions, and the weights are
uniformly bounded by 0 < α ≤ wl ≤ β, ∀l.
(iii) The composition of the sorting and weighted zero-selective reduce functions with respect
to F and k is defined by φkF : Rk × Rk → R, which is defined for all z ∈ Rk and w ∈ Rk
such that 0 < α ≤ wl ≤ β by
φkF (z, w) = r
k
0,F (ρk(z), w).
6In this case, a simple choice for the weights in discrete time is to let wij [t] = 1/(1 + di[t] − |Ri[t]|) for j ∈ Vi[t] and
wii[t] = (|Ri[t]| − di[t])/(1 + di[t]− |Ri[t]|). In continuous time, let wij ≡ 1 for j ∈ Vi[t] and wii[t] = |Ri[t]| − di[t].
rk0,F (z, w) =


∑F
l=1wl1≥0(zl)zl +
∑k−F
l=F+1wlzl +
∑k
l=k−F+1wl1≤0(zl)zl k > 2F ;
∑k−F
l=1 wl1≥0(zl)zl +
∑k
l=F+1wl1≤0(zl)zl F < k ≤ 2F ;
0 k ≤ F ;
(5)
Then, the update rule of ARC-P for each normal node i ∈ N for t ∈ R≥0 is given by
fi,σ(t)(t, xN , xA) = φ
di[t]
F (Ji[t](x[t] − xi[t]1n), wi[t]) , (6)
in which x[t] = [xTN [t], xTA[t]]T ∈ Rn and 1n ∈ Rn is the vector of ones. The time-varying weight
vector
wi[t] = [wii1[t][t], wii2[t][t], . . . , wiidi[t][t][t]]
T,
satisfies the bound 0 < α ≤ wiij [t] ≤ β for all j = 1, 2, . . . , di[t], where i1[t], i2[t], . . . , idi[t][t] are
the node indices of the neighbors of node i in the order determined by the sorting function at
time t (i.e., according to (4) such that the weights match the corresponding neighbor). Finally,
Ji[t] ∈ R(di[t])×n is a sparse matrix with each row corresponding to a distinct j ∈ Vi[t] such
that each row has a single 1 in the j-th column. Thus, there is a one-to-one correspondence
between j ∈ Vi[t] and rows in Ji[t]. These terms are defined so that (6) is equivalent to (3) for
all t ∈ R≥0.
1) Existence and Uniqueness of Solutions: As a first step toward showing existence and
uniqueness of solutions, we show that (6) satisfies a Lipschitz condition for all i ∈ N .
Definition 7: Let || · || denote any norm defined on a Euclidean space, and let g(t, x, u),
g : R×Rn×Rp → Rq, be a piecewise continuous function in t and u. Then g satisfies a global
Lipschitz condition with Lipschitz constant L if the following condition holds for all z, y ∈ Rn,
t ∈ R:
||g(t, z, u)− g(t, y, u)|| ≤ L||z − y||.
Theorem 1: The function fσ(t)(t, xN , xA) = fσ(t)(t, x) that defines the dynamics of the normal
nodes, with fi,σ(t)(·) defined in (6), satisfies a global Lipschitz condition in xN and x.
Proof: Because the weights are piecewise continuous and the switching signal is piecewise
constant, it follows that fσ(t)(t, x) is piecewise continuous in t. We first show that fσ(t)(t, x)
satisfies a Lipschitz condition in x by showing that the component functions fi,σ(t)(t, x) do. For
this, fix t ∈ R≥0, F ∈ Z≥0, di[t] = k, and wi[t] = w. The argument to φkF (·, w) is linear and the
sorting function is Lipschitz, as shown in [16]. Hence, all there is to show is that the weighted
zero-selective reduce function with respect to F and k is Lipschitz. Fix z, y ∈ Rk. The key
observation is that
1≥0(zl)zl − 1≥0(yl)yl ≤ |zl − yl|,
for each l = 1, 2, . . . , k, which is trivial to show by checking the four cases depending on the
signs of zl and yl. Since 0 < α ≤ wl ≤ β, it follows that
wl1≥0(zl)zl − wl1≥0(yl)yl ≤ β|zl − yl|,
Likewise, the inequality holds when the indicator function is 1≤0(·) instead of 1≥0(·). Combining
this with the triangle inequality, it is straightforward to show using the Manhattan norm that
rk0,F is Lipschitz with Lipschitz constant β. Finally, we show fσ(t)(t, xN , xA) satisfies a Lipschitz
condition in xN . Fix y, z ∈ RN and note that the malicious nodes’ trajectories are uniformly
continuous in time by assumption (and therefore fσ(t)(t, xN , xA) is piecewise continuous in time).
Since, there exists a global Lipschitz constant for x, denoted L, we know
||fσ(t)(t, y, xA)− fσ(t)(t, z, xA)||
≤ L
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= L||y − z||.
Since we assume that σ(t) is piecewise constant, xA is piecewise continuous (in fact we assume
it is uniformly continuous on [0,∞)), and the weights are piecewise continuous, it follows that
fσ(t)(t, xN , xA) defined by (1) with component functions given in (6) is piecewise continuous
in t. Theorem 1 shows that fσ(t)(·) is Lipschitz in xN . We show next in Lemma 1 that fσ(t)(·)
is bounded by the current normal values xN [t] for t ∈ R≥0. From these facts, we conclude the
local existence and uniqueness of solutions of (6) for all i ∈ N . Then, we show in Lemma 2
that any solution is confined to a compact set, from which we conclude global existence and
uniqueness of solutions of (6) for all i ∈ N .
Lemma 1: Consider the normal node i ∈ N with continuous dynamics executing ARC-P with
parameter F ∈ Z≥0 and assume there are at most F adversary nodes in its neighborhood at time
t. Then, for each t ∈ R≥0
B(m[t]− xi[t]) ≤ fi,σ(t)(xN , xA) ≤ B(M [t] − xi[t]),
where B = β(n− F − 1), m[t] = minj∈N{xj [t]}, and M [t] = maxk∈N{xk[t]}.
Proof: If di[t] ≤ F , or if F < di[t] ≤ 2F and there are at most F neighbors with larger and
smaller values than xi[t], then fi,σ(t)(t, xN , xA) = 0, and the result follows. Therefore, assume
di[t] > F and at least one value not equal to xi[t] is used in the update at time t, say xj [t].
Suppose xj [t] > M [t]. Then, by definition j must be an adversary and xj [t] > xi[t]. Since i uses
xj [t] at time t, there must be at least F more nodes in the neighborhood of i with values at least
as large as xj [t]. Hence, these nodes must also be adversaries, which contradicts the assumption
of at most F adversary nodes in the neighborhood of i at time t. Thus, xj [t] ≤M [t]. Similarly,
we can show that xj [t] ≥ m[t]. By combining the fact that there are at most n− 1 neighbors of
i, at least F values will be removed (since di[t] > F ), and wij[t] ≤ β for all j ∈ Vi[t], it follows
that
B(m[t]− xi[t]) ≤
∑
j∈Vi[t]\Ri[t]
wij[t](xj [t]− xi[t]) ≤ B(M [t] − xi[t]).
Observe that Lemma 1 holds under both the F -total and F -local models, and bounds fσ(t)(·)
as a function of the total number of nodes n, the upper bound on the number of adversaries
in the neighborhood of any normal node F , and the current state of the normal node values
xN [t]. The next result shows that for any solution of (1), the hypercube H0, which is given by
[m[0],M [0]]N , is a robustly positively invariant set (defined as follows).
Definition 8: The set S ⊂ RN is robustly positively invariant for the system given by (1)
if for all xN [0] ∈ S, xA[t] ∈ RA, any solution satisfies xN [t] ∈ S for all t ≥ 0.
Lemma 2: Suppose the normal nodes in N have continuous dynamics and use ARC-P with
parameter F ∈ Z≥0 under the F -local or F -total malicious model. Then, the hypercube H0 =
[m[0],M [0]]N defined by
H0 = {y ∈ R
N : m[0] ≤ yi ≤M [0], i = 1, 2, . . . , N},
is robustly positively invariant for the system of normal nodes.
Proof: Since H0 is compact and any solution of (1) using (6) is continuous with xN [0] ∈
H0, we must show that fσ(t)(·) is not directed outside of H0, whenever xN [t] ∈ ∂H0, for all
Dσ(t) ∈ Γn and all allowable trajectories of xA. The boundary of H0 is given by
∂H0 = {y ∈ H0 : ∃i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N} s.t. yi ∈ {m[0],M [0]}}.
Now, fix xN ∈ ∂H0 for some t ∈ R≥0. Let ej denote the j-th canonical basis vector and
denote IN ,min, IN ,max ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , N} as the sets defined by
j ∈ IN ,min ⇔ xj = m[0] and k ∈ IN ,max ⇔ xk = M [0].
Then, from the geometry of the hypercube, we require
eTj fσ(t)(t, xN , xA) ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ IN ,min,
eTk fσ(t)(t, xN , xA) ≤ 0 ∀k ∈ IN ,max.
These conditions are true for all Dσ(t) ∈ Γnand xA under the F -local or F -total models by
Lemma 1, in which the lower bound is used for j ∈ IN ,min (since xj = m[0]), and the upper
bound is used for k ∈ IN ,max (since xk = M [0]).
The argument made in Lemma 1 implies that any time an adversary under the F -total or
F -local model is outside of It = [m[t],M [t]], its influence is guaranteed to be removed by its
normal neighbors, and therefore has the same effect as if it were on the boundary of It. Using
Lemma 2 we conclude It ⊆ I0, ∀t ≥ 0. Hence, each adversary is effectively restricted to the
compact set I0, with respect to (1). This fact enables us to allow adversary states in RA rather
than explicitly restricting them to a compact set, while still ensuring existence and uniqueness
of solutions.
Corollary 1: Given the choice of bounded, piecewise continuous, time-varying weights, piece-
wise constant switching signal, and adversaries (i.e., adversary value trajectories) that satisfy the
F -local or F -total malicious model, the system of normal nodes defined by (1) with component
functions given in (6) has a unique solution for all t ≥ 0 and for any xN [0] ∈ RN .
IV. ROBUST NETWORK TOPOLOGIES
A. Network Robustness
In this section, we introduce robust network topologies that satisfy certain graph theoretic
properties, which we refer to generically as network robustness. Network robustness formalizes
the notion of sufficient redundancy of information flow to subsets of a network in a single
Fig. 1. Example of a 5-connected graph satisfying Prop. 1 whenever F = 2.
hop. Therefore, this property holds promise to be effective for the study of resilient distributed
algorithms that use only local information. In contrast, network connectivity formalizes the
notion of sufficient redundancy of information flow across the network through independent
paths. Due to the fact that each independent path may include multiple intermediate nodes,
network connectivity is well-suited for studying resilient distributed algorithms that assume such
nonlocal information is available (for example, by explicitly relaying information across multiple
hops in the network [20], or by ‘inverting’ the dynamics on the network to recover the needed
information [23], [29]). However, network connectivity is no longer an appropriate metric for
an algorithm that uses purely local information, such as ARC-P. This is demonstrated by the
following proposition [34].
Proposition 1: There exists a graph with connectivity κ = ⌊n
2
⌋+F −1 in which ARC-P does
not ensure asymptotic consensus.
Figure 1 illustrates an example of this kind of graph with n = 9, F = 2, and κ = 5. In
this graph, there are two cliques (complete subgraphs), X = K4 and Y = K5, where Kn is
the complete graph on n nodes. Each node in X has exactly F = 2 neighbors in Y , and all
but two nodes in Y have F = 2 neighbors in X (nodes 5 and 9 have only one neighbor in
X , because otherwise a node in X would have more than F = 2 neighbors in Y ). One can
see that if the initial values of nodes in X and Y are a ∈ R and b ∈ R, respectively, with
a 6= b, then asymptotic consensus is not achieved whenever ARC-P is used with parameter F –
even in the absence of misbehaving nodes. This is because each node views the values of its F
neighbors from the opposing set as extreme, and removes all of these values from its list. The
only remaining values for each node are from its own set, and thus no node ever changes its
value.
The situation can be even worse in the more general case of digraphs. Examples of digraphs
are illustrated in [18] that are (n − 1)-connected and have minimum out-degree n − 2, yet
ARC-P still cannot guarantee asymptotic consensus. Thus, even digraphs with a relatively large
connectivity (or minimum out-degree) are not sufficient to guarantee consensus of the normal
nodes, indicating the inadequacy of these traditional metrics to analyze the convergence properties
of ARC-P. Taking a closer look at the graph in Fig. 1, we see that the reason for the failure
of consensus is that no node has enough neighbors in the opposite set; this causes every node
to throw away all useful information from outside of its set, and prevents consensus. Based on
this intuition, the following properties, i.e., r-reachable sets and r-robustness, were introduced
in [34].
Definition 9 (r-reachable set): Given a digraph D and a nonempty subset S of nodes of D,
we say S is an r-reachable set if ∃i ∈ S such that |Vi \ S| ≥ r, where r ∈ Z≥0.
A set S is r-reachable if it contains a node that has at least r neighbors outside of S. The
parameter r quantifies the redundancy of information flow from nodes outside of S to some
node inside S. Intuitively, the r-reachability property captures the idea that some node inside
the set is influenced by a sufficiently large number of nodes from outside the set. The above
reachability property pertains to a given set S; in order to generalize this notion of redundancy
to the entire network, we introduce the following definition of r-robustness.
Definition 10 (r-robustness): A nonempty, nontrivial digraph D = {V, E} on n nodes (n ≥ 2)
is r-robust, with r ∈ Z≥0, if for every pair of nonempty, disjoint subsets of V , at least one of
the subsets is r-reachable. By convention, if D is empty or trivial (n ≤ 1), then D is 0-robust.
The trivial graph is also 1-robust.
The reason that pairs of nonempty, disjoint subsets of nodes are considered in the definition
of r-robustness can be seen in the example of Fig. 1. If either X or Y were 3-reachable (r =
F +1 = 3), then at least one node would be sufficiently influenced by a node outside of its set in
order to drive it away from the values of its group, and thereby lead its group to the values of the
other set. However, if there are misbehaving nodes in the network, then the situation becomes
more complex. For example, consider the F -total model of malicious nodes, and consider two
sets X and Y in the graph. Let s be the total number of nodes in these two sets that each have
at least F + 1 neighbors outside their own set. If s ≤ F , then simply by choosing these nodes
to be malicious, the sets X and Y contain no normal nodes that bring in enough information
from outside, and thus the system can be prevented from reaching consensus. This reasoning
suggests a need to specify a minimum number of nodes that are sufficiently influenced from
outside of their set (in this example, at least F + 1 nodes). This intuition leads to the following
generalizations of r-reachability and r-robustness.
Definition 11 ((r, s)-reachable set): Given a digraph D and a nonempty subset of nodes S,
we say that S is an (r, s)-reachable set if there are at least s nodes in S with at least r neighbors
outside of S, where r, s ∈ Z≥0; i.e., given XS = {i ∈ S : |Vi \ S| ≥ r}, then |XS | ≥ s.
Observe that r-reachability is equivalent to (r, 1)-reachability; hence, (r, s)-reachability is a
strict generalization of r-reachability. If a set S is (r, s)-reachable, we know there are at least s
nodes in S with at least r neighbors outside of S. Thus, if S is (r, s)-reachable, then it is (r, s′)-
reachable, for s′ ≤ s. Also, it is clear that s ≤ |S| and all subsets of nodes of any digraph are
(r, 0)-reachable. The additional specificity on the number of nodes with redundant information
flow from outside of their set is useful for defining a more general notion of robustness.
Definition 12 ((r, s)-robustness): A nonempty, nontrivial digraph D = {V, E} on n nodes
(n ≥ 2) is (r, s)-robust, for nonnegative integers r ∈ Z≥0, 1 ≤ s ≤ n, if for every pair of
nonempty, disjoint subsets S1 and S2 of V such that S1 is (r, sr,1)-reachable and S2 is (r, sr,2)-
reachable with sr,1 and sr,2 maximal (i.e., sr,k = |XSk | where XSk = {i ∈ Sk : |Vi \ Sk| ≥ r} for
k ∈ {1, 2}), then at least one of the following hold:
(i) sr,1 = |S1|;
(ii) sr,2 = |S2|;
(iii) sr,1 + sr,2 ≥ s.
By convention, if D is empty or trivial (n ≤ 1), then D is (0,1)-robust. If D is trivial, D is also
(1,1)-robust.
A few remarks are in order with respect to this definition. The definition of (r, s)-robustness
aims to capture the idea that enough nodes in every pair of nonempty, disjoint sets S1,S2 ⊂ V
have at least r neighbors outside of their respective sets. To quantify what is meant by “enough”
nodes, it is necessary to take the maximal sr,k for which Sk is (r, sr,k)-reachable for k ∈ {1, 2}
(since Sk is (r, s′r,k)-reachable for s′r,k ≤ sr,k). Since sr,k = |XSk |, condition (i) or (ii) means
that all nodes in Sk have at least r neighbors outside of Sk. Given a pair S1,S2 ⊂ V such that
Fig. 2. A 3-robust graph that is not (3,2)-robust.
0 < |S1| < r and S2 = V \ S1, there can be no more than |S1| nodes with at least r neighbors
outside of their set. Hence, conditions (i) and (ii) quantify the maximum number of nodes
with at least r neighbors outside of their set for such pairs, and must therefore be “enough”.
Alternatively, if there are at least s nodes with at least r neighbors outside of their respective sets
in the union S1 ∪S2, then condition (iii) is satisfied. For such pairs S1,S2 ⊂ V , the parameter7
1 ≤ s ≤ n quantifies what is meant by “enough” nodes.
An important observation is that (r, 1)-robustness is equivalent to r-robustness. This holds
because conditions (i)− (iii) for (r, 1)-robustness collapse to the condition that at least one of
S1 and S2 is r-reachable. In general, a digraph is (r, s′)-robust if it is (r, s)-robust for s′ ≤ s;
therefore, a digraph is r-robust whenever it is (r, s)-robust. The converse, however, is not true.
Consider the graph in Fig. 2. This graph is 3-robust, but is not (3, 2)-robust. For example, let
S1 = {1, 3, 5, 6, 7} and S2 = {2, 4}. Thus, only node 2 has at least 3 nodes outside of its set,
so all of the conditions (i) − (iii) fail. Therefore, (r, s)-robustness is a strict generalization of
r-robustness.
Next, consider again the example of Fig. 1. It can be shown that this graph is (2, s)-robust,
for all 1 ≤ s ≤ n = 8. This follows because all nodes in at least one of the sets S1 and S2 has
at least 2 neighbors outside of their set, for any nonempty and disjoint S1,S2 ⊂ V . Therefore,
condition (iii) in Definition 12 is never needed, and the definition is satisfied with r = 2 for all
7Note that s = 0 is not allowed in (r, s)-robustness because in that case any digraph on n ≥ 2 nodes satisfies the definition
for any r ∈ Z≥0, which subverts the interpretation of the parameter r. At the other extreme, the maximal meaningful value of
s is s = n since condition (iii) can never be satisfied with s > n.
valid values of s.
On the other hand, the graph in Fig. 1 is not 3-robust. This can be shown by selecting S1 = X
and S2 = Y . Note that an (r, s)-robust digraph is (r′, s)-robust for r′ ≤ r. The question then
arises, how does one compare relative robustness between digraphs? Clearly, if digraph D1 is
(r1, s1)-robust and digraph D2 is (r2, s2)-robust with maximal rk and sk for k ∈ {1, 2}, where
r1 > r2 and s1 > s2, then one can conclude that D1 is more robust than D2. However, in
cases where r1 > r2 but s1 < s2, which digraph is more robust? For example, the graph of
Fig. 1 is (2, s)-robust for all 1 ≤ s ≤ n = 8, but is not 3-robust, whereas the graph in Fig. 2
is 3-robust, but is not (2,5)-robust (e.g., let S1 = {1, 5, 6} and S2 = {2, 3, 4}). In general, the
r-robustness property takes precedence in the partial order that determines relative robustness,
and the maximal s in (r, s)-robustness is used for finer grain partial ordering (i.e., ordering the
robustness of two r-robust digraphs with the same value of r). Therefore, the graph in Fig. 2
is more robust than the graph of Fig. 1. Yet, the graph of Fig. 2 is only 3-connected, whereas
the graph of Fig. 1 is 5-connected. Hence, it is possible that a digraph with less connectivity is
more robust.
We demonstrate in Section V that the r-robustness property is useful for analyzing ARC-P
with parameter F under the F -local model, and show that (r, s)-robustness is the key property
for analyzing ARC-P with parameter F under the F -total model. More specifically, we show
that (F + 1, F +1)-robustness of the network is both necessary and sufficient for normal nodes
using ARC-P with parameter F to achieve resilient asymptotic consensus whenever the scope
of threat is F -total, the threat model is malicious, and the network is time-invariant. Likewise,
we show that (2F + 1)-robustness of the network is sufficient for ARC-P with parameter F to
achieve resilient asymptotic consensus whenever the scope of threat is F -local.
B. Construction of Robust Digraphs
Note that robustness requires checking every possible nonempty disjoint pair of subsets of
nodes in the digraph for certain conditions. Currently, we do not have a computationally efficient
method to check whether these properties hold in arbitrary digraphs. However, in [34] it is shown
that the common preferential-attachment model for complex networks (e.g., [2]) produces r-
robust graphs, provided that a sufficient number of links are added to the network as new nodes
are attached. In this subsection, we extend this construction to show that preferential-attachment
also leads to (r, s)-robust graphs.
Theorem 2: Let D = {V, E} be a nonempty, nontrivial (r, s)-robust digraph. Then the digraph
D′ = {V ∪ {vnew}, E ∪ Enew}, where vnew is a new vertex added to D and Enew is the directed
edge set related to vnew, is (r, s)-robust if dvnew ≥ r + s− 1.
Proof: For any pair of nonempty, disjoint sets S1 and S2, there are three cases to check:
vnew 6∈ Si , {vnew} = Si and vnew ∈ Si, i ∈ {1, 2}. In the first case, since D is (r, s)-robust, the
conditions in Definition 12 must hold. In the second case, XSi = Si, and we are done. In the
third case, suppose, without loss of generality, S2 = S ′2∪{vnew}. Since D is (r, s)-robust, at least
one of the following conditions hold: sr,1 + s′r,2 ≥ s, sr,1 = |S1|, or s′r,2 = |S ′2|. If either of the
first two hold, then the corresponding conditions hold for the pair S1,S2 in D′. So assume only
s′r,2 = |S
′
2| holds. Then, the negation of the first condition sr,1+ s′r,2 ≥ s implies s′r,2 = |S ′2| < s.
Hence, |Vvnew \ S2| ≥ r, and sr,2 = |S2|, completing the proof.
The above result indicates that to construct an (r, s)-robust digraph with n nodes (where
n > r), we can start with an (r, s)-robust digraph with relatively smaller order (such as a
complete graph), and continually add new nodes with incoming edges from at least r + s − 1
nodes in the existing digraph. Note that this method does not specify which existing nodes
should be chosen. The preferential-attachment model corresponds to the case when the nodes
are selected with a probability proportional to the number of edges that they already have. This
leads to the formation of so-called scale-free networks [2], and is cited as a plausible mechanism
for the formation of many real-world complex networks. Theorem 2 indicates that a large class of
scale-free networks are resilient to the threat models studied in this paper (provided the number
of edges added in each round is sufficiently large when the network is forming).
For example, Fig. 3 illustrates a (3, 2)-robust graph constructed using the preferential attach-
ment model starting with the complete graph on 5 nodes, K5 (which is also (3,3)-robust and is
the only (3,2)-robust digraph on 5 nodes), and with 4 new edges added to each new node. Note
that this graph is also 4-robust, which could not be predicted from Theorem 2 since K5 is not
4-robust. Therefore, it is actually possible (but not guaranteed) to end up with a more robust
digraph than the initial one using the preferential-attachment growth model.
Fig. 3. A (3, 2)-robust graph constructed from K5 using preferential attachment.
V. RESILIENT CONSENSUS RESULTS
In this section, we provide the key results showing that sufficiently robust digraphs guarantee
resilient consensus. We begin with the following result showing that ARC-P always satisfies the
safety condition for resilient asymptotic consensus. Recall that M [t] and m[t] are the maximum
and minimum values of the normal nodes at time t, respectively.
Lemma 3: Suppose each normal node updates its value according to ARC-P with parameter
F under the F -total or F -local malicious model. Then, for each normal node i ∈ N , xi[t] ∈
[m[0],M [0]] for all t, regardless of the network topology.
Proof: The proof for discrete time is straightforward and follows directly from the definitions
and the fact that the values in Ji[t] \ Ri[t] used in the ARC-P update rule lie in the interval
[m[t],M [t]] and the update rule in (3) is a convex combination of these values. For continuous
time, we have proved this in Lemma 2.
An immediate consequence of Lemma 3 is that M [·] is nonincreasing with time, and m[·] is
nondecreasing with time. From this, it follows that the Lyapunov candidate Ψ[t] = M [t]−m[t]
is nonincreasing with time. In the following sections, we show that this Lyapunov function
decreases over sufficiently large time intervals whenever the normal nodes update their values
according to ARC-P, provided the network is sufficiently robust.
A. F -Total Model
Theorem 3: Consider a time-invariant network modeled by a directed graph D = {V, E}
where each normal node updates its value according to ARC-P with parameter F . Then, resilient
asymptotic consensus is achieved under the F -total malicious model if and only if the network
topology is (F + 1, F + 1)-robust.
Proof: (Necessity) If D is not (F + 1, F + 1)-robust, then there are nonempty, disjoint
S1,S2 ⊂ V such that none of the conditions (i) − (iii) hold. Suppose the initial value of each
node in S1 is a and each node in S2 is b, with a < b. Let all other nodes have initial values
taken from the interval (a, b). Since sF+1,1 + sF+1,2 ≤ F , suppose all nodes in XS1 and XS2 are
malicious and keep their values constant. With this assignment of adversaries, there is still at
least one normal node in both S1 and S2 since sF+1,1 < |S1| and sF+1,2 < |S2|, respectively.
Since these normal nodes remove the F or less values of in-neighbors outside of their respective
sets, no consensus among normal nodes is reached.
(Sufficiency) [Continuous Time] We know from Lemma 3 that both M [·] and m[·] are
monotone and bounded functions of t, and therefore each of them has a limit, denoted by
AM and Am, respectively. Note that if AM = Am, then the normal nodes will achieve resilient
asymptotic consensus. We will prove by contradiction that this must be the case. The main
idea behind the proof is to use the gap between AM and Am and combine this with both the
uniform continuity assumption on the malicious nodes’ value trajectories and a careful selection
of subsets of nodes to show that Ψ[t] will shrink to be smaller than the gap AM − Am in
finite time (a contradiction). To this end, suppose that AM 6= Am (note that AM > Am by
definition). Since M [t] → AM monotonically, we have M [t] ≥ AM for all t ≥ 0. Similarly,
m[t] ≤ Am for all t ≥ 0. Moreover, for each ǫ > 0 there exists tǫ > 0 such that M [t] < AM + ǫ
and m[t] > Am − ǫ, ∀t ≥ tǫ. Next, define constant ǫ0 = (AM − Am)/4 > 0, which satisfies
M [t]− ǫ0 ≥ m[t] + ǫ0 + (AM − Am)/2. This inequality informs the choice of subsets of nodes
to be defined shortly in order to limit the influence of the malicious nodes. Indeed, since the
adversary trajectory xk is uniformly continuous on [0,∞) for k ∈ A, it follows that for each
ν > 0, there exists δk(ν) > 0 such that |xk[t1]− xk[t2]| < ν whenever |t1 − t2| < δk(ν). Define
δ(ν) = mink∈A{δk(ν)}.
Next, we define the sets of nodes that are vital to the proof. For any t0 ≥ 0, t ≥ t0, ∆ > 0,
and η > 0, define
XM(t, t0,∆, η)={i ∈ V : ∃t
′ ∈ [t, t +∆] s.t. xi[t′] > M [t0]− η}
and
Xm(t, t0,∆, η)={i ∈ V : ∃t
′ ∈ [t, t +∆] s.t. xi[t′] < m[t0] + η}.
Observe that if we choose η ≤ ǫ0 = (AM − Am)/4, ν < (AM − Am)/2, and ∆ < δ(ν), then
we are guaranteed that for any t0 ≥ 0 and t ≥ t0, XM(t, t0,∆, η) ∩ Xm(t, t0,∆, η) ∩ A = ∅.
That is, with these choices of η, ν, and ∆, no malicious node can be in both XM(t, t0,∆, η) and
Xm(t, t0,∆, η). This follows because otherwise there exists t1, t2 ∈ [t, t + ∆] and k ∈ A such
that xk[t1] > M [t0]− η and xk[t2] < m[t0] + η, from which we reach the contradiction
xk[t1]− xk[t2] > M [t0]−m[t0]− 2η ≥
AM −Am
2
> ν.
We proceed by showing that if we choose η, ν, and ∆ small enough, then no normal node
can be in both XM(t, t0,∆, η) and Xm(t, t0,∆, η) for any t0 ≥ 0 and t ≥ t0. First, we require
some generic bounds on the normal node trajectories. For i ∈ N with xi[t′] < M [t′], we know
from Lemmas 1 and 3 that for t ≥ t′,
x˙i[t] =
∑
j∈Vi\Ri[t]
wij[t] (xj [t]− xi[t]) ≤ B(M [t
′]− xi[t]),
whenever the derivative exists8, where B = (n−F−1)β is the product of the upper bound on the
weights β and the maximum number of neighboring values used that have value M [t] ≤M [t0],
n− 1− F (since there is a maximum of n− 1 neighbors, F of which would be thrown away).
Using the integrating factor eB(t−t′), and integrating in the sense of Lebesgue, we have
xi[t] ≤ xi[t
′]e−B(t−t
′) +M [t′](1− e−B(t−t
′)), ∀t ≥ t′. (7)
By interchanging the roles of t and t′, we have
xi[t] ≥ xi[t
′]eB(t
′−t) +M [t](1 − eB(t
′−t)), ∀t ≤ t′. (8)
Similarly, we can show that for j ∈ N with xj [t′] > m[t′],
xj [t] ≥ xj [t
′]e−B(t−t
′) +m[t′](1− e−B(t−t
′)), ∀t ≥ t′, (9)
and
xj [t] ≤ xj [t
′]eB(t
′−t) +m[t](1 − eB(t
′−t)), ∀t ≤ t′, (10)
8The solutions of the normal nodes’ trajectories are understood in the sense of Carathe´odory. Hence, it is possible that the
derivative of the solution does not exist on a set of points in time of Lebesgue measure zero.
Now fix η ≤ ǫ0 = (AM − Am)/4, ν < (AM − Am)/2, and ∆ < min{δ(ν), log(3)/B}, and
suppose i ∈ N ∩ XM (t, t0,∆, η). Then ∃t′ ∈ [t, t+∆] such that xi[t′] > M [t0]− η. Combining
this with (9), it follows that for s ∈ [t′, t+∆],
xi[s] ≥ xi[t
′]e−B(s−t
′) +m[t′](1− e−B(s−t
′))
> (M [t0]− η)e
−B(s−t′) +m[t0](1− e
−B(s−t′))
≥ (AM − η)e
−B(s−t′) +m[t0]−Ame
−B(s−t′)
≥ m[t0] + (AM − Am)e
−B(s−t′) −
AM −Am
4
e−B(s−t
′)
≥ m[t0] +
3
4
(AM − Am)e
−B∆
> m[t0] +
AM −Am
4
≥ m[t0] + η,
where we have used the fact that ∆ < log(3)/B in deriving the last line. Similarly, using (8), it
follows that for s ∈ [t, t′],
xi[s] ≥ xi[t
′]eB(t
′−s) +M [s](1 − eB(t
′−s))
> (M [t0]− η)e
B(t′−s) +M [s](1 − eB(t
′−s))
≥M [s]− ηeB(t
′−s)
≥M [s]− η
≥ AM −
AM −Am
4
=
AM + Am
2
+
AM − Am
4
≥ m[t0] + η.
Therefore, i /∈ Xm(t, t0,∆, η).
Similarly, with the given choices for η, ν, and ∆, if j ∈ N ∩ Xm(t, t0,∆, η), then it follows
from (7) that for s ∈ [t′, t+∆],
xj [s] ≤ xj [t
′]e−B(s−t
′) +M [t′](1− e−B(s−t
′))
< (m[t0] + η)e
−B(s−t′) +M [t0](1− e
−B(s−t′))
≤M [t0]− (M [t0]−m[t0])e
−B(s−t′) + ηe−B(s−t
′)
≤M [t0]− (AM −Am)e
−B(s−t′) +
AM − Am
4
e−B(s−t
′)
≤M [t0]−
3
4
(AM − Am)e
−B∆
< M [t0]−
AM − Am
4
≤M [t0]− η,
where we have used the fact that ∆ < log(3)/B in deriving the last line. Finally, using (10), it
follows that for s ∈ [t, t′],
xj [s] ≤ xj [t
′]eB(t
′−s) +m[s](1− eB(t
′−s))
< (m[t0] + η)e
B(t′−s) +m[s](1− eB(t
′−s))
≤ m[s] + ηeB(t
′−s)
≤ m[s] + η
≤ Am +
AM − Am
4
=
AM + Am
2
−
AM − Am
4
≤M [t0]− η.
Thus, j /∈ XM(t, t0,∆, η). This shows that XM(t, t0,∆, η) and Xm(t, t0,∆, η) are disjoint for
appropriate choices of the parameters.
Next, we show that by choosing ǫ small enough, we can define a sequence of sets, {XM(tǫ+
k∆, tǫ,∆, ǫk)}k=Nk=0 and {Xm(tǫ+ k∆, tǫ,∆, ǫk)}k=Nk=0 , where N = |N |, so that we are guaranteed
that by the N th step, at least one of the sets contains no normal nodes. This will be used to show
that Ψ has shrunk below AM −Am. Toward this end, let ǫ0 = (AM −Am)/4, ν < (AM −Am)/2,
and ∆ < min{δ(ν), log(3)/B}. Then fix
ǫ <
1
2
[α
B
(1− e−B∆)e−B∆
]2N
ǫ0.
For k = 0, 1, 2, . . . , N , define ǫk = [ αB (1 − e
−B∆)e−B∆]2kǫ0, which results in ǫ0 > ǫ1 > · · · >
ǫN > 2ǫ > 0. For brevity, define X kM = XM(tǫ + k∆, tǫ,∆, ǫk) and X km = Xm(tǫ + k∆, tǫ,∆, ǫk)
for k = 0, 1, . . . , N . Observe that by definition, there is at least one normal node (the ones
with extremal values) in X 0M and X 0m, and we have shown above that all of the X kM and X km
are disjoint. It follows from the fact that there are at most F malicious nodes in the network
(F -total model) and D is (F + 1, F + 1)-robust, that either ∃i ∈ X 0M ∩ N or ∃i ∈ X 0m ∩ N (or
both) such that i has at least F +1 neighbors outside of its set. That is, either i has at least F +1
neighbors i1, i2, . . . , iF+1 such that xik [t] ≤ M [tǫ]− ǫ0 for all t ∈ [tǫ, tǫ +∆] (if i ∈ X 0M ∩ N ),
or xik [t] ≥ m[tǫ] + ǫ0 for all t ∈ [tǫ, tǫ + ∆] (if i ∈ X 0m ∩ N ). Note that it can be shown that
the minimum in-degree of an (F + 1, F + 1)-robust digraph is at least 2F + 1. It follows from
this that i will always use at least one neighbor’s value in its update. Assume i ∈ X 0M ∩N and
suppose that none of the F + 1 (or more) neighbors outside of X 0M are used in its update at
some time t′ ∈ [tǫ, tǫ +∆] at which the derivative exists. Then, xi[t′] ≤ M [t0]− ǫ0 (otherwise,
it would use at least one of its F + 1 neighbors’ values outside of X 0M . It follows from (7) that
xi[tǫ +∆] ≤M [tǫ]− ǫ0e
−B∆.
Using this with (7) to upper bound xi[t] for t ∈ [tǫ +∆, tǫ + 2∆], we see that
xi[t] ≤M [tǫ]− ǫ0e
−2B∆ ≤M [tǫ]− ǫ1.
Therefore, in this case i /∈ X 1M . Alternatively, assume at least one of the values from its neighbors
outside of X 0M is used for almost all t ∈ [tǫ, tǫ +∆]. Then,
x˙i[t] ≤ α(M [tǫ]− ǫ0 − xi[t]) + (B − α)(M [tǫ]− xi[t])
≤ −Bxi[t] +BM [tǫ]− αǫ0,
for almost all t ∈ [tǫ, tǫ +∆]. Using this, we can show
xi[tǫ +∆] ≤ xi[tǫ]e
−B∆ + (M [tǫ]−
αǫ0
B
)(1− e−B∆)
≤M [tǫ]−
α
B
(1− e−B∆)ǫ0.
Using this with (7) to upper bound xi[t] for t ∈ [tǫ + ∆, tǫ + 2∆], we see that for all t ∈
[tǫ +∆, tǫ + 2∆],
xi[t] ≤M [tǫ]−
α
B
(1− e−B∆)e−B(t−tǫ−∆)ǫ0
≤M [tǫ]−
α
B
(1− e−B∆)e−B∆ǫ0
≤M [tǫ]− ǫ1.
Thus, in either case i /∈ X 1M . The final step is to show that j /∈ X 1m whenever j is a normal node
with j /∈ X 0m. Since j /∈ X 0m, it means that xj [tǫ +∆] ≥ m[tǫ] + ǫ0. Using this with (9) to lower
bound xj [t] for t ∈ [tǫ +∆, tǫ + 2∆], we see that
xj [t] ≥ m[tǫ] + ǫ0e
−B∆ ≥ m[tǫ] + ǫ1.
Hence, j is also not in X 1m, as claimed. Therefore, if i ∈ X 0M ∩N has at least F + 1 neighbors
outside of its set, we are guaranteed that |X 1M ∩ N | < |X 0M ∩ N | and |X 1m ∩ N | ≤ |X 0m ∩ N |.
Using a similar argument, we can show that if i ∈ X 0m ∩N has at least F +1 neighbors outside
of its set, we are guaranteed that |X 1m ∩N | < |X 0m ∩N | and |X 1M ∩ N | ≤ |X 0M ∩ N |.
Now, if both X 1M ∩N and X 1m ∩N are nonempty, we can repeat the above argument to show
that either |X 2m ∩ N | < |X 1m ∩ N | or |X 2M ∩ N | < |X 1M ∩ N |, or both. It follows by induction
that as long as both X jM ∩ N and X jm ∩ N are nonempty, then either |X j+1m ∩ N | < |X jm ∩ N |
or |X j+1M ∩ N | < |X
j
M ∩ N | (or both), for j = 1, 2, . . . . Since |X 0m ∩ N | + |X 0M ∩ N | ≤ N ,
there exists T < N such that at least one of X TM ∩ N and X Tm ∩ N is empty. If X TM ∩ N = ∅,
then M [tǫ + T∆] ≤ M [tǫ] − ǫT < M [tǫ] − 2ǫ. Similarly, if X Tm ∩ N = ∅, then m[tǫ + T∆] ≥
m[tǫ] + ǫT > m[tǫ] + 2ǫ. In either case, Ψ[tǫ + T∆] < AM − Am and we reach the desired
contradiction.
(Sufficiency) [Discrete Time] Because Ψ is a nonincreasing function of t, whenever the normal
nodes are in agreement at time t0, then consensus is maintained for t ≥ t0. Therefore, fix t0 ≥ 0
and assume Ψ[t0] > 0. For t ≥ t0 and η > 0, define XM(t, t0, η) = {j ∈ V : xj [t] > M [t0]− η}
and Xm(t, t0, η) = {j ∈ V : xj [t] < m[t0] + η}. Define ǫ0 = Ψ[t0]/2 and define ǫj = αǫj−1
for j = 1, 2, . . . , N − 1, where N = N . It follows that ǫj = αjǫ0 > 0. By definition, the sets
Xm(t0, t0, ǫ0) and Xm(t0, t0, ǫ0) are nonempty and disjoint. Because D is (F + 1, F + 1)-robust
and there are at most F malicious nodes in the network (F -total model), it follows that either
there exists i ∈ XM(t0, t0, ǫ0)∩N or there exists i ∈ Xm(t0, t0, ǫ0)∩N , or there exists such i in
both, such that i has at least F+1 neighbors outside of its set. Therefore, if i ∈ XM(t0, t0, ǫ0)∩N
(with at least F + 1 neighbors outside its set), then
xi[t0 + 1] = xi[t0] +
∑
j∈Ji\Ri[t0]
wij[t0]xj [t0]
≤ α(M [t0]− ǫ0) + (1− α)M [t0]
≤M [t0]− αǫ0 = M [t0]− ǫ1.
Note that for any normal node not in XM(t0, t0, ǫ0), the above inequality holds because any
normal node always uses its own value in the update. From this, we conclude |XM(t0+1, t0, ǫ1)∩
N | < |XM(t0, t0, ǫ0) ∩ N |. Similarly, if i ∈ Xm(t0, t0, ǫ0) ∩ N (with at least F + 1 neighbors
outside its set), then
xi[t0 + 1] = xi[t0] +
∑
j∈Ji\Ri[t0]
wij [t0]xj [t0]
≥ α(m[t0] + ǫ0) + (1− α)m[t0]
≥ m[t0] + αǫ0 = m[t0] + ǫ1.
Similarly as above, this inequality holds for any normal node not in Xm(t0, t0, ǫ0). From this,
we conclude
|Xm(t0 + 1, t0, ǫ1) ∩N | < |Xm(t0, t0, ǫ0) ∩ N |.
By repeating this analysis, we can show by induction that as long as both XM(t0+j, t0, ǫj)∩N
and Xm(t0 + j, t0, ǫj) ∩ N are both nonempty, then either |XM(t0 + j + 1, t0, ǫj+1) ∩ N | <
|XM(t0 + j, t0, ǫj) ∩ N |, or |Xm(t0 + j + 1, t0, ǫj+1) ∩ N | < |Xm(t0 + j, t0, ǫj) ∩ N |, or both.
Since |XM(t0, t0, ǫ0) ∩ N |+ |Xm(t0, t0, ǫ0) ∩ N | ≤ |N | = N , there exists T < N such that one
of the sets XM(t0 + T, t0, ǫT ) ∩N , Xm(t0 + T, t0, ǫT ) ∩N , or both, is empty. It follows that in
the former case, M [t0 + T ] ≤M [t0]− ǫT , and in the latter case, m[t0 + T ] ≥ m[t0] + ǫT . Since
ǫ0 > ǫ1 > · · · > ǫT ≥ ǫN−1 > 0, we have
Ψ[t0+N − 1]−Ψ[t0] ≤ Ψ[t0 + T ]−Ψ[t0]
≤ (M [t0 + T ]−M [t0]) + (m[t0]−m[t0 + T ])
≤ −ǫT ≤ −ǫN−1.
Therefore, Ψ[t0 + N − 1] ≤ Ψ[t0](1 − αN−1/2). Define c = (1 − αN−1/2). Since c is not a
function of t0 and t0 was chosen arbitrarily, it follows that
Ψ[t0 + k(N − 1)] ≤ c
kΨ[t0],
for all k ∈ Z0. Because c < 1, it follows that Ψ[t]→ 0 as t→∞.
When the network is time-varying, one can state the following corollary of the above theorem.
Corollary 2: Consider a time-varying network modeled by a directed graph D[t] = {V, E [t]}
where each normal node updates its value according to ARC-P with parameter F . Then, resilient
asymptotic consensus is achieved under the F -total malicious model if there exists t0 ≥ 0 such
that D[t] is (F + 1, F + 1)-robust, ∀t ≥ t0.
Proof: [Continuous Time] The proof follows the contradiction argument of the proof of
Theorem 3, but here we use the dwell time assumption. In this case, let
∆ < min{δ(ν), log(3)/B, τ
N
}.
Fix
ǫ <
1
2
[α
B
(1− e−B∆)e−B∆
]2N
ǫ0,
and let t′ǫ ≥ 0 be the time such that M [t] < AM + ǫ and m[t] > Am − ǫ for all t ≥ t′ǫ
and define t′ = max{t0, t′ǫ}. Then, associated to the switching signal σ(t), we define tǫ as the
next switching instance after t′, or t′ itself if there are no switching instances after t′. Since
∆ < τ/N , the same sequence of calculations can be used (as in the proof of Theorem 3) to
show that Ψ[tǫ + T∆] < AM −Am.
[Discrete Time] The argument in the proof of Theorem 3 holds for t ≥ t0. Hence,
Ψ[t0 + k(N − 1)] ≤ c
kΨ[t0],
for all k ∈ Z0. Because c < 1, it follows that Ψ[t]→ 0 as t→∞.
To illustrate these results on the examples of Section IV, the graphs in Figs. 1, 2, and 3
can withstand the compromise of at most 1 malicious node in the network using ARC-P with
parameter F = 1 (each graph is (2,2)-robust but not (3,3)-robust). This is not to say that it is
impossible for the normal nodes to reach consensus if there are, for example, two nodes that
are compromised. Instead, these results say that it is not possible that any two nodes can be
compromised and still guarantee resilient asymptotic consensus using ARC-P with parameter
F = 2.
B. F -Local Model
Theorem 4: Consider a time-invariant network modeled by a directed graph D = {V, E}
where each normal node updates its value according to ARC-P with parameter F . Then, resilient
asymptotic consensus is achieved under the F -local malicious model if the network topology is
(2F + 1)-robust. Furthermore, a necessary condition is for the topology of the network to be
(F + 1)-robust.
Proof: The necessity proof is given in [34]. The sufficiency proof follows the same line as
that of Theorem 3. In continuous time, the main difference is that the sets of nodes XM and Xm
include only normal nodes. That is, for any t0 ≥ 0, t ≥ t0, ∆ > 0, and η > 0, define
XM(t, t0,∆, η)={i ∈ N : ∃t
′ ∈ [t, t+∆] s.t. xi[t′] > M [t0]− η}
and
Xm(t, t0,∆, η)={i ∈ N : ∃t
′ ∈ [t, t+∆] s.t. xi[t′] < m[t0] + η}.
Likewise, for k = 1, 2, . . . , N , the definitions of X kM and X km are modified to include only normal
nodes. The analysis showing that X kM and X km are disjoint still holds. By definition, it follows that
X 0M and X 0m are nonempty. Since the network is (2F + 1)-robust, either ∃i ∈ X 0M or ∃i ∈ X 0m,
or both, such that i has at least 2F + 1 neighbors outside of its set. If such i is in X 0M , then
at most F of the neighbors are malicious (F -local model) and the others are normal with value
xj [t] ≤M [tǫ]− ǫ0 for t ∈ [tǫ, tǫ +∆]. The remaining argument follows the same line as that of
Theorem 3. (Notice in this case that the uniform continuity assumption on the malicious nodes
is not needed).
In discrete time, the sets XM and Xm are defined to include only normal nodes. Then, the
(2F + 1)-robust assumption under the F -local model ensures at least one normal value outside
of either XM or Xm will be used in the update. The rest of the analysis is identical to the proof
of Theorem 3.
As with the F -total model, we have the following corollary (whose proof follows the same
line as that of Corollary 2).
Corollary 3: Consider a time-varying network modeled by a directed graph D[t] = {V, E [t]}
where each normal node updates its value according to ARC-P with parameter F . Then, resilient
asymptotic consensus is achieved under the F -local malicious model if there exists t0 ≥ 0 such
that D[t] is (2F + 1)-robust, ∀t ≥ t0.
To illustrate these results, consider the 3-robust graph of Fig. 2. Recall that this graph cannot
generally sustain 2 malicious nodes as specified by the 2-total model; it is not (3,3)-robust.
However, under the 1-local model, it can sustain two malicious nodes if the right nodes are
compromised. For example, nodes 1 and 4 may be compromised under the 1-local model and
the normal nodes will still reach consensus. This example illustrates the advantage of the F -local
model, where there is no concern about global assumptions. If a digraph is (2F +1)-robust, then
up to F nodes may be compromised in any node’s neighborhood, possibly resulting in more
than F malicious nodes in the network (as in the previous example).
VI. SIMULATIONS
This section presents a numerical example to illustrate our results. In this example, the network
is given by the (2,2)-robust graph shown in Fig. 4. Since the network is (2,2)-robust, it can
sustain a single malicious node in the network under the 1-total model. Suppose that the node
with the largest degree, node 14, is compromised and turns malicious. The nodes have continuous
dynamics and the normal nodes use either the Linear Consensus Protocol (LCP) given in (2)
or ARC-P for their control input. In either case, the weights are selected to be unity for all
neighboring nodes that are kept, with the self-weights selected as −di for LCP and |Ri[t]| − di
for ARC-P for each normal node i ∈ N . The initial values of the nodes are shown in Fig. 4
beneath the label of the node’s value. The goal of the malicious agent is to drive the values of
the normal nodes to a value of 2.
Fig. 4. (2,2)-Robust Network topology.
The results for this example are shown in Fig. 5. It is clear in Fig. 5(a) that the malicious node
is able to drive the values of the normal nodes to its value of 2 whenever LCP is used. On the
other hand, the malicious node is unable to achieve its goal whenever ARC-P is used. Note that
due to the large degree of the malicious node, it has the potential to drive the consensus process
to any value in the interval [0, 1] by choosing the desired value as its initial value and remaining
constant. However, this is allowed with resilient asymptotic consensus (because the consensus
value is within the range of the initial values held by normal nodes). Another observation is that
the consensus process in the case of ARC-P is slower than LCP; this is to be expected, due to
the fact that ARC-P effectively removes certain edges from the network at each time instance.
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(b) ARC-P.
Fig. 5. Malicious node attempts to drive the values of the normal nodes to a value of 2. The malicious node succeeds whenever
LCP is used, but fails whenever ARC-P is used.
VII. DISCUSSION
The notion of graph connectivity has long been the backbone of investigations into fault
tolerant and secure distributed algorithms. Indeed, under the assumption of full knowledge of
the network topology, connectivity is the key metric in determining whether a fixed number of
malicious adversaries can be overcome. However, in large scale systems and complex networks,
it is not practical for the various nodes to obtain knowledge of the global network topology.
This necessitates the development of algorithms that allow the nodes to operate on purely local
information. This paper continues and extends the work started in [16], [18], [34], and represents
a step in this direction for the particular application of distributed consensus. Using the ARC-P
algorithm developed in [16], the notion of robust graphs introduced in [34], and the extensions
of each presented here, we characterize necessary/sufficient conditions for the normal nodes
in large-scale networks to mitigate the influence of adversaries. We show that the notions of
robust digraphs are the appropriate analogues to graph connectivity when considering purely
local filtering rules at each node in the network. Just as the notion of connectivity has played
a central role in the existing analysis of reliable distributed algorithms with global topological
knowledge, we believe that robust digraphs (and its variants) will play an important role in the
investigation of purely local algorithms.
In a recent paper, developed independently of our work, Vaidya et al. have characterized the
tight conditions for resilient consensus using only local information whenever the threat model
is Byzantine and the scope of threat is F -total [32]. The network constructions used in [32] are
very similar to the robust digraphs presented here. In particular, the networks in [32] also require
redundancy of information flow between subsets of nodes in the network in a single hop.
Finally we summarize the main works related to resilient consensus using only local informa-
tion in Table I. In this table, we include only works on resilient consensus (also referred to as
Byzantine approximate consensus, or just approximate consensus in the literature) in synchronous
networks that use only local information, with no relaying of information across the network
and with networks that are not complete (since complete networks provide global information
and have high communication cost). Further discussion about the relationship of the results in
this paper (and in [16], [18], [32], [34]) to approximate consensus can be found in [34] and [32].
TABLE I
RELATED WORK FOR RESILIENT CONSENSUS IN SYNCHRONOUS NETWORKS USING ONLY LOCAL INFORMATION (NO
NONLOCAL INFORMATION, NO RELAYS, AND THE NETWORK IS not COMPLETE).
❳
❳
❳
❳
❳
❳
❳
❳
❳
❳
❳
❳
❳
Scope
Threat Model
Byzantine Malicious
F -total [18], [32] [18], this paper
F -local – [34], this paper
VIII. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
H. J. LeBlanc and X. Koutsoukos are supported in part by the National Science Foundation
(CNS-1035655, CCF-0820088), the U.S. Army Research Office (ARO W911NF-10-1-0005),
and Lockheed Martin. The views and conclusions contained herein are those of the authors and
should not be interpreted as necessarily representing the official policies or endorsements, either
expressed or implied, of the U.S. Government. H. Zhang and S. Sundaram are supported in part
by a grant from the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada (NSERC),
and by a grant from the Waterloo Institute for Complexity and Innovation (WICI).
REFERENCES
[1] N. Agmon and D. Peleg. Fault-tolerant gathering algorithms for autonomous mobile robots. SIAM J. Comput., 36(1):56–82,
2006.
[2] R. Albert and A.-L. Baraba´si. Statistical mechanics of complex networks. Rev. Mod. Phys., 74(1):47–97, Jan 2002.
[3] Z. Bouzid, M. G. Potop-Butucaru, and S. Tixeuil. Optimal byzantine-resilient convergence in uni-dimensional robot
networks. Theoretical Computer Science, 411(34-36):3154–3168, 2010.
[4] A. A. Ca´rdenas, S. Amin, and S. Sastry. Research challenges for the security of control systems. In Proceedings of the
3rd conference on Hot topics in security, July 2008.
[5] D. W. Casbeer, D. B. Kingston, R. W. Beard, T. W. Mclain, S.-M. Li, and R. Mehra. Cooperative forest fire surveillance
using a team of small unmanned air vehicles. International Journal of Systems Sciences, 37(6):351–360, May 2006.
[6] N. Chopra and M. W. Spong. Passivity-based control of multi-agent systems. In Advances in Robot Control, From Everyday
Physics to Human-Like Movements, Sadao Kawamura and Mikhail Svinin (Eds), pages 107 – 134. Springer Verlag, Berlin,
2006.
[7] J. Corte´s. Distributed algorithms for reaching consensus on general functions. Automatica, 44(3):726 – 737, 2008.
[8] X. De´fago, M. Gradinariu, S. Messika, and P. Raipin-Parve´dy. Fault-tolerant and self-stabilizing mobile robots gathering.
In S. Dolev, editor, Distributed Computing, volume 4167 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 46–60. Springer
Berlin, Heidelberg, 2006.
[9] J. A. Fax and R. M. Murray. Information flow and cooperative control of vehicle formations. IEEE Transactions on
Automatic Control, 49(9):1465–1476, 2004.
[10] V. Gupta, C. Langbort, and R. Murray. On the robustness of distributed algorithms. In IEEE Conf. on Decision and
Control, pages 3473 –3478, San Diego, California, December 2006.
[11] J. Hromkovic, R. Klasing, A. Pelc, P. Ruzicka, and W. Unger. Dissemination of Information in Communication Networks.
Springer-Verlag, 2005.
[12] A. Ichimura and M. Shigeno. A new parameter for a broadcast algorithm with locally bounded Byzantine faults. Information
Processing Letters, 110:514–517, 2010.
[13] A. Jadbabaie, J. Lin, and A. Morse. Coordination of groups of mobile autonomous agents using nearest neighbor rules.
IEEE Transactions on Aut. Control, 48(6):988 – 1001, jun. 2003.
[14] D. Kingston, R. Beard, and R. Holt. Decentralized perimeter surveillance using a team of UAVs. IEEE Transactions on
Robotics, 24(6):1394 –1404, Dec. 2008.
[15] L. Lamport, R. Shostak, and M. Pease. The Byzantine generals problem. ACM Trans. Program. Lang. Syst., 4(2):382–401,
1982.
[16] H. J. LeBlanc and X. D. Koutsoukos. Consensus in networked multi-agent systems with adversaries. In Proceedings of
the 14th international conference on Hybrid systems: computation and control, (HSCC ’11), pages 281–290, Chicago, IL,
2011.
[17] H. J. LeBlanc, H. Zhang, S. Sundaram, and X. D. Koutsoukos. Consensus of multi-agent networks in the presence of
adversaries using only local information. In Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on High Confidence Networked
Systems, (HiCoNS ’12), pages 1–10, Beijing, China, 2012.
[18] H. J. LeBlanc and X. D. Koutsoukos. Low complexity resilient consensus in networked multi-agent systems with
adversaries. In Proceedings of the 15th international conference on Hybrid systems: computation and control, (HSCC
’12), pages 5–14, Beijing, China, 2012.
[19] J. Lorenz and D. Lorenz. On conditions for convergence to consensus. IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control,
55(7):1651–1656, July 2010.
[20] N. A. Lynch. Distributed Algorithms. Morgan Kaufmann Publishers Inc., San Francisco, California, 1997.
[21] L. Moreau. Stability of multiagent systems with time-dependent communication links. IEEE Trans. on Aut. Control,
50(2):169 – 182, Feb. 2005.
[22] R. Olfati-Saber, J. A. Fax, and R. M. Murray. Consensus and cooperation in networked multi-agent systems. Proceedings
of the IEEE, 95(1):215–233, 2007.
[23] F. Pasqualetti, A. Bicchi, and F. Bullo. Consensus computation in unreliable networks: A system theoretic approach. IEEE
Trans. on Aut. Control, 57(1):90–104, Jan. 2012.
[24] A. Pelc and D. Peleg. Broadcasting with locally bounded Byzantine faults. In Information Processing Letters, pages
109–115, 2005.
[25] W. Ren and R. Beard. Consensus seeking in multiagent systems under dynamically changing interaction topologies. IEEE
Transactions on Automatic Control, 50(5):655 – 661, May 2005.
[26] W. Ren, R. Beard, and E. Atkins. Information consensus in multivehicle cooperative control. IEEE Control Systems
Magazine, 27(2):71–82, April 2007.
[27] L. Scardovi and R. Sepulchre. Synchronization in networks of identical linear systems. Automatica, 45(11):2557–2562,
2009.
[28] S. Sundaram and C. Hadjicostis. Distributed function calculation and consensus using linear iterative strategies. IEEE
Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, 26(4):650–660, May 2008.
[29] S. Sundaram and C. Hadjicostis. Distributed function calculation via linear iterative strategies in the presence of malicious
agents. IEEE Trans. on Aut. Control, 56(7):1495 –1508, July 2011.
[30] B. Touri and A. Nedic´. On ergodicity, infinite flow, and consensus in random models. IEEE Transactions on Automatic
Control, 56(7):1593–1605, July 2011.
[31] J. N. Tsitsiklis. Problems in Decentralized Decision Making and Computation. PhD thesis, Department of EECS, MIT,
1984.
[32] N. Vaidya, L. Tseng, and G. Liang. Iterative approximate Byzantine consensus in arbitrary directed graphs. CoRR,
abs/1201.4183, 2012.
[33] L. Xiao and S. Boyd. Fast linear iterations for distributed averaging. Systems and Control Letters, 53:65–78, 2004.
[34] H. Zhang and S. Sundaram. Robustness of information diffusion algorithms to locally bounded adversaries. In Proceedings
of the American Control Conf., June 2012. to appear.
